Don't believe the reports of October 7 warnings, or Netanyahu's denials - analysis
One question should stand above all others – how could the UAE and Egypt have known that Hamas was planning October 7, when the IDF, Shin Bet, Mossad and Netanyahu himself didn't know?
In the weeks leading up to the October 7 attacks, tensions were high between Israel and Hamas over the internal situation inside the Gaza Strip. Then-Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar threatened to bring back the "Marches of Return" along the border fence, where clashes had already resumed; he sent out Hamas units to detonate explosive devices along the border fence, and resumed launching incendiary balloons at Israeli territory.
In response, Israel closed the Erez Crossing and barred thousands of workers from Gaza from entering Israel for work.
Back in those days, regional countries including Egypt and the UAE were concerned that the situation would flare up into another round of escalation, as was the case in the two decades before that. This important context is often overlooked or even forgotten when talking about what Israel knew, or didn't know, in the lead-up to October 7.
Fast forward three years to this past month, which saw a flurry of reports that Prime Minister Netanyahu received several specific warnings from UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed and Egypt's Intelligence Chief Abbas Kamel that Hamas was planning to launch "something big", with the word "Zilzal" (Arabic for 'earthquake') thrown around to describe the magnitude of the impending attack. By the way, Sinwar referenced an upcoming "Zilzal" in almost all of his speeches.
Putting aside the question of the validity of these various reports by Ha'aretz, the Atlantic and Wall Street Journal, one question should stand above all others – how could the UAE and Egypt have known that Hamas was planning to storm into Israel, kill 1,200 civilians and soldiers, and kidnap 251 Israelis, when the IDF, Shin Bet, Mossad and Netanyahu himself didn't know? Not even Hezbollah's Nasrallah or Hamas's Gulf hosts in Qatar knew about the impending attack. Sinwar managed to fool everyone.
Only a handful of Hamas leaders knew about the October 7 plans, in what has emerged as one of the best-kept secrets of the past decade. But Mohamed bin Zayed and Abbas Kamel did know? Something doesn't add up.
Based on the various testimonies by various IDF intelligence officers and the female border "spotters", Israel did have all the information, but tragically overlooked it and failed to assess the magnitude of what was coming. But even now, we don't know exactly what the IDF, Shin Bet, Mossad, and Netanyahu knew leading up to October 7.
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And herein lies the problem. In the absence of a state commission of inquiry, there is no way to objectively determine who knew what, and to what extent. Israelis are forced to base their knowledge on various news reports, which are consistently denied by the Israelis Prime Minister's Office. Who must they believe?
Media outlets, some of which have questionable reputations, citing anonymous sources at a time of a highly divisive election season, or a Prime Minister who half the country doesn't believe a word he says? It's an impossible decision.
Until there is such a commission of inquiry, whose establishment is being blocked by Netanyahu's government, one must rely on their own instincts and media savvy to determine who is right. Israelis deserve better. Israelis deserve a commission of inquiry. Until then, expect more reports, denials, rinse and repeat.