Level of Gaza reconstruction to decide future of Arab-Israeli normalization - veteran Saudi journalist | Opinion

With the Gaza ceasefire taking root, the Middle East finds itself at a fateful juncture, and Arab-Israeli normalization at a new, more challenging phase. The regional environment has changed dramatically since October 2023 as a result of the Gaza fight, shifting US policy and changing security assessments. The future may well not be a return to the pre-war status quo, but an adjustment to normalization processes that has been influenced by elite strategy and popular mentality.

Conditionality Revisited: The Arab Peace Initiative as It Rediscovered Its Center

Just months into 2025, the Arab states again made clear they are committed to peace with Israel, but conditions are apparent: normalization now explicitly depends not just on the recognition of Israel, but also on the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

"Palestine Summit" in Cairo in March 2025 endorsed a unanimous statement restating the Arab Peace Initiative underscores the need to facilitate peace and the two-state solution as a condition for normalization. This is somewhat strategic on the part of the Arab leaders, to try to answer domestic pressures for independence and sovereignty while seeking regional stability and making a common cause with the United States.

The Abraham Accords: Success and Stability Amid Regional Challenges

The Abraham Accords, signed by the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of the repercussions of the Gaza war and regional fluctuations, affirming their effectiveness, strong foundations, and sound strategic vision. There has been little to no popular pressure against the normalization process; rather, a sense of calm and societal silence prevails, reflecting a broad consensus that relations with Israel represent a strategic and pragmatic choice serving the national and developmental interests of these countries.

The Abraham Accords countries have proven their ability to separate economic and security partnerships with Israel from transient political disagreements, while continuing to develop various fields of cooperation—whether in the economy, technology, or security—in ways that enhance their regional standing and support their future vision. These countries continue to support normalization as an option that serves their national interests and strengthens their capacity to confront security challenges, especially in light of ongoing Iranian threats, while maintaining alignment with Saudi policy directions.

The persistence of these agreements despite crises confirms that they are not merely temporary political arrangements, but rather deep strategic transformations that have demonstrated their ability to overcome pressures and challenges. They have established a new model for regional cooperation based on shared interests and long term stability.

Saudi Arabia: The Decisive Actor

Saudi Arabia will remain the keystone for potential normalization. Though the Gaza conflict muddied the road, Riyadh’s strategic calculus remains clear: normalization with Israel is doable, but only after substantial Palestinian statehood and security guarantees. The Kingdom’s leadership is still balancing domestic sensitivities inflamed by this Gaza war against the benefits of diversification of alliances and in a countering of Iranian reach. "Normalization is still on the table," experts have recorded, but "it will not move ahead as long as the Gaza conflict is raging.

Jordan and Egypt: Tenuous Peace, Growing Pressures

Jordan and Egypt, two countries with peace treaties with Israel, have survived a number of crises. The Gaza war has reopened public pressure to reconsider these relationships, but the academy’s structural sinews — territorial arrangements, economic interconnection, US backing — are intact. Both nations have emerged as the key countries in post-conflict reconstruction today, with Egypt playing a prominent role in regional plans for the rehabilitation of Gaza and supporting a gradual process of reconstruction and political discussions that could lead to a two-state solution.

New Variables: Reconstruction, Iran and US Policy

Litmus test: Gaza Reconstruction: The extent to which Gaza is reconstructed and successful in Gaza will determine prospects of normalization. If Gulf nations, led by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, can assist in rebuilding Gaza in a way that is nonobstructive to Israel, it could lay a foundation for new modes of cooperation. Yet if Palestinian grievances or Israeli obstructions remain unaddressed, this momentum of normalization could stall or reverse.

Iran’s Changing Role: The response to the Israeli and US strikes on Iran has left the country significantly weakened in a regional capacity, and with reduced proxy leverage in Gaza and Lebanon. This may encourage Arab states to seek normalization of relations as a counterweight to Iran, although public discourse remains cautious.

US Policy Reset: The position of the incoming Trump Administration will be pivotal. Arab leaders have urged the United States to assume a constructive peacemaking role, including putting an end to American support for Israeli annexation and forced displacement proposals. The fate of normalization depends on whether Washington addresses Arab doubts over Palestinian rights and allows the Israeli flexibility it seeks to serve as an inducement.

Three Possibilities for the Next Stage

Fragmented Normalization: Existing agreements persist, but expansion stalls. UAE and Morocco maintain ties; Saudi Arabia engages conditionally; others adopt a cautious approach. Probability: 60 percent.

Conditional Breakthrough: Major progress on Palestinian statehood or Gaza reconstruction unlocks new normalization deals, led by US diplomacy and Israeli concessions. Probability: 25 percent.

Normalization Reversal: Sustained instability or escalation forces some Arab states to suspend or downgrade relations, though full reversal remains unlikely. Probability: 15 percent.

Policy Recommendations for Regional Stakeholders

Focus on Palestinian Aspirations: Authentic normalization will only be sustainable if it comes with real progress on statehood and rights for Palestinians. There is no longer a way out of going around the question of Palestine.

Adapt Strategies to the Domestic Reality: Acknowledge the diversity of Arab societies and political blocs; resist the imposition of uniform models.

Create Durable Institutions: Create means for preservation of cooperative relationships through crisis: do not be turned away from diplomatic and economic connection so easily.

Modernize Normalization Through Regional Security: Embed normalization within larger multilateral security and economic infrastructure as a way of addressing systemic challenges.

Conclusion

The post-Gaza ceasefire era marks the beginning of a more nuanced, conditional, and

complicated new period of Arab-Israeli normalization. The final course will be

determined by whether regional leadership is able to balance strategic interests with

mass aspirations, to take into account Palestinian rights and to navigate a changing

regional order. The task is formidable — but so is the potential for a more stable and

integrated Middle East.

Abdulaziz Alkhamis is a veteran Saudi journalist and researcher on Middle Eastern affairs.