Analysis: Two short letters that tell a big story on Israel, Europe

It's a treasure to find two simple letters that tell such an intricate story: Big politics, small politics, geopolitics, media, foreign relations – and a striking, bald summary of Israel's standing in Europe. 

Beware of most headlines pronouncing that the "EU" has done this or that. The EU is less one organization and more a network of them. It has an elected European Parliament, the European Commission – the executive arm – and the European Council – heads of state or government who make big-picture decisions.

The story of the letters is, in part, about the interplay of these different EU arms and how that interplay affects Israel.

It started on November 14. Twenty-four members of the European Parliament – mostly from the left, some from the center-left and center – sent a letter to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

The summary: Israel keeps demolishing buildings the EU has paid for in the West Bank. The EU keeps putting out condemnations that Israel blows off. So when will the EU finally, in the letter-writers' view, slap down sanctions and get Israel to pay attention?

The parliament members then received their reply. But, it came on January 6, more than a month and a half after the query was sent. And the response came not from Borrell, to whom the letter had been addressed, but instead from European Crisis Management Commissioner Janez Lenarčič, whose ambit seems to focus on responses to emergencies rather than standard EU humanitarian work such as that in the West Bank.

In his letter, Lenarčič, too, bemoaned Israeli policies in the West Bank. He added that the EU has asked Israel "on a number of occasions" for compensation. But remember the letter-writers' ask? A list of policy options for, essentially, sanctions?

Well… "At this stage, a list of possible options to secure compensation from Israel for EU funding lost in demolitions has not been discussed” – basically, “the Commission is doing nothing and will continue to do nothing. It's a waste of time.”

And “it is for the [European] Council, acting by unanimity, to decide on the possible adoption of EU restrictive measures” – in other words, “you want sanctions? Go talk (for sake of example) to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Sanctions need every one of 27 member state governments to agree. If Orban wakes up and decides to veto, the sanctions are dead. Talk to him, not to us, we're on your side.”

So the story is not that the EU "demands reparations" – even if, technically, they do. The real story here is that the EU, in practice, was not demanding reparations. That the hands of activists in the Parliament and technocrats in the Commission were tied because the real hammer is in the hands of the weakest link among the 27 member state governments.

A few side questions before the main takeaway: First, the Parliament members sent their letter on November 14. The reply came almost two months later. The Christian holiday season may well supply a partial answer. But, still, did the Commission want to put off its reply, and think over what to do with the hot potato?

Second, note where that hot potato landed. The lawmakers addressed their question to Borrell, a logical audience. But, again, it was not Borrell who answered. That task was left to Lenarčič, whose "crisis management" purview would not seem to include ongoing West Bank work. Why is it that the EU's quasi-foreign minister does not respond to a foreign policy question addressed to him?

Third, how did this item get in the media's hands, and with the spin given to it? Was an industrious journalist refreshing the database of Parliament queries and Commission replies? Or did a source point the media in a certain direction, and with a certain message to convey?

But none of these are the key takeaway. That takeaway is how this exchange, in a wondrous nutshell, set out the true power dynamics inside the EU, in the bloc’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in the EU-Israel relationship. The backstop of the single member-state veto is Israel's key point of leverage, one that is bound both to protect the Jewish state in the final instance and to frustrate other key players in Europe along the way.

So, cultivating relationships in friendly European capitals is a natural, continued goal for Israeli policymakers, even if Jerusalem might see an upside in reaching out to persuadable officials inside the EU system frustrated by Israel's policies. It is still better to be loved than feared.