Opinion: Israel facing the war in Ukraine - an unjustified ambiguity

The recent setbacks of the Jewish Agency in Russia - which could lead to its activities being banned in the territory - have often been interpreted in Israel as the result of Moscow's annoyance with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid's position on the war in Ukraine. 

In fact, since the first days of the Russian invasion, Lapid, then-foreign minister, has consistently condemned Moscow's attitude, using a tone and vocabulary very similar to that of Western leaders. 

One could speak of a real sharing of roles, on this issue, at the head of the Israeli government: Lapid denounced the invasion without ambiguity, while then-prime minister, Naftali Bennett, tried to spare the Russian leaders, contenting himself with expressing his compassion for Ukrainian civilians. 

For Jerusalem's leaders, it was a matter of trying to reassure Israel's traditional allies, first and foremost the Americans and the British, while trying not to offend Moscow.

Two arguments were put forward to justify this effort of caution towards Russia: the presence of large Jewish communities in the two countries involved in the conflict; and above all the need to maintain dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin's military, in order to guarantee Israeli freedom of maneuver in its air operations in Syria. 

A strong argument, legitimate and easily understandable, but whose relevance can be questioned on several levels.

Air force superiority

First of all, it should be noted that the airstrikes attributed to Israel in Syria have not diminished in intensity since the "cold snap" observed in Israeli-Russian relations, and that some strikes have even targeted objectives close to Russian military bases. 

Coordination between the Israeli military (IDF) and the Russian air force continues, and does not seem to be affected by the fate of the Jewish Agency or Putin's lack of sympathy for Lapid. This is largely because Russia, although an ally of Iran, is primarily concerned with the stability of the region, and does not look kindly on the expansionist ambitions of the mullahs' regime in the Middle East, especially in Syria, which is considered by Moscow as veritable territory. 

It is appropriate to ask about the strategic consequences of an overt Israeli desire to spare Russia. Let us recall that one of the constants of Israeli defense doctrine is based on the Israeli air force's superiority over all adversaries in the region. Appearing to fear the reactions of another air force presence in the Middle East, however powerful, would risk giving the Jewish state's enemies the impression of questioning this doctrine, as well as an image of weakness, as unjustified as it is strategically harmful. 

All the more so since Russia's interests are far from being identical to those of Israel, as shown by Moscow's loyalty to its traditional allies in the Arab-Muslim world, who are often among Jerusalem's most resolute enemies.

Authoritarianism to totalitarianism

Another strategic reason that might have caused Israel to take a clearer stand against Russia's invasion of Ukraine has to do with the likely long-term consequences of this war on Moscow's regime. For the powerful Russian army, this military adventure has turned into a fiasco, revealing its many weaknesses. For the Russian economy, which was already underperforming, it has proved disastrous. The regime reacted with a predictable turn of the screw, evolving from authoritarianism to totalitarianism - it is in this evolution that lies the real cause of the probable ban on the activities of the Jewish Agency on Russian territory.

These are all signs of decline, which, compared to the relative but real vigor with which Western democracies reacted to the aggression, should leave little room for doubt as to which side will ultimately emerge stronger from this confrontation. Taking a clear position in favor of Ukraine would have been in Israel's best interest.

Support for democracy

Ideological and even civilizational considerations also have their place. Israel is indeed a democratic nation-state, and intends to remain so; this is precisely what Ukraine was trying to become, engaged in an inevitably long and imperfect but promising process, brutally interrupted by the aggression of which it was the victim. 

From an Israeli point of view, support for Ukraine should therefore have gone much further than humanitarian assistance, however admirable and useful it may be. It is not superfluous to recall in this perspective which are the currents and the parties which, in the Western democracies, and particularly in France, have shown the greatest indulgence towards the Russian invasion: precisely, on the extreme right and on the extreme left, those who show themselves to be the most hostile to Israel, and sometimes the most dangerously close to antisemitism.

This reminder leads logically enough to the last argument in favor of an unambiguous positioning of Israel on the side of Ukraine - the last, but by no means the most negligible - which is a justification of an ethical nature: because of its historical heritage, the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people had to stand unequivocally on the side of a people so cruelly and unjustly attacked.