- i24NEWS
- Middle East
- Hadramout: the fault line that could decide southern Yemen’s future - analysis
Hadramout: the fault line that could decide southern Yemen’s future - analysis
Recent clashes underscore Hadramout’s value as both a geographic prize and political crossroads- likely determining whether southern Yemen unifies or remains fragmented

New demonstrations have taken place in Aden and other southern Yemeni cities, reviving demands for southern secession.
While such protests are not unprecedented, their timing highlights a moment of political and military uncertainty in southern Yemen, shaped by clashes in Hadramout, shifting regional roles, and unresolved questions about authority on the ground.
Over recent years, the Southern Transitional Council (STC)-a southern political and military body backed by the United Arab Emirates—has consolidated control over most southern territories, including Aden, Lahj, Dhale, Abyan, and Shabwa. While the STC is not internationally recognized as a sovereign government, it exercises de facto authority across much of southern Yemen and is represented within Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council.
This consolidation has steadily marginalized the internationally recognized government, leaving the south largely governed by STC-aligned security forces rather than functioning state institutions.
Hadramout, Yemen’s largest and most strategically significant governorate, remains the critical exception. Recent clashes there underscore its importance not only as a geographic prize, but as a political and military crossroads. Control over Hadramout would likely determine whether southern Yemen could emerge as a coherent political entity or remain fragmented among competing centers of power.
Within the STC leadership, including its president Aidarous al-Zubaidi, Hadramout is widely viewed as indispensable. The prevailing belief is that any future southern political project would be incomplete, and potentially unsustainable, without the governorate’s economic resources, territorial depth, and social influence.
These internal dynamics have been accompanied by sudden regional developments. Saudi forces recently withdrew, without public explanation, from protecting the presidential palace in Aden and from al-Mayoun (Perim) Island, a strategically sensitive location overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea. The move was widely interpreted as a sign of Riyadh recalibrating its engagement in southern Yemen.
At the same time, the chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council departed Aden for Saudi Arabia, reinforcing perceptions of a political vacuum in the south and raising questions about where effective decision-making authority now resides.
Against this backdrop, Brigadier General Tareq Saleh, commander of the National Resistance Forces—a Yemeni military faction backed by the United Arab Emirates and controlling much of Yemen’s western coast—described the battle for Hadramout as part of an effort to “unify the military theater.” He framed it as preparation for a future confrontation with the Houthis, who control large parts of northern Yemen. His remarks reflect a broader view within segments of the anti-Houthi camp that internal consolidation must precede any decisive escalation.
In southern Yemen, however, this narrative is met with skepticism. Activists and political figures warn that military coordination, while strategically logical, risks once again subordinating long-standing southern demands for self-determination to wider conflict priorities.
The protests in Aden reflect these concerns. Demonstrators question why, despite expanding territorial control and years of sacrifice, the south remains in political limbo—marked by deteriorating public services and an uncertain political horizon. Many also fear that Hadramout could become a battleground not only against the Houthis, but among rival anti-Houthi forces.
Regionally, the gap between international caution and realities on the ground continues to widen. Saudi Arabia appears increasingly focused on border security and de-escalation with the Houthis, while the United Arab Emirates maintains influence through local partners without formally endorsing southern secession. International actors, meanwhile, continue to prioritize Yemen’s territorial integrity, even as de facto divisions deepen.
Southern Yemen now occupies an ambiguous space—neither an independent entity nor an effectively governed part of a unified state. In this context, renewed protests serve as a reminder that the “southern question” can no longer be indefinitely deferred.
Whether Hadramout becomes a pillar of consolidation or a new fault line will shape not only the future of southern Yemen, but the trajectory of the country’s broader conflict.
