From South Ossetia to Abkhazia: Is Moscow beginning a quiet annexation of separatist regions?

About 18 years after recognizing the independence of South Ossetia from Georgia, Russia now appears to be shifting from a policy of supporting the separatist entity to a deeper stage of political and administrative integration. Observers see these steps as a prelude to gradual annexation without an official declaration, raising questions about whether the same model could be applied to other separatist republics, such as Abkhazia and Transnistria.

The latest of these steps came after Russian President Vladimir Putin and former South Ossetian President Alan Gagloyev signed an agreement last May to "deepen cooperation" between the two sides. The agreement included a gradual unification in the fields of economy, foreign policy, defense, and security, in addition to allowing Russian citizens, for the first time, to hold official positions within the institutions of the separatist republic.

A Russian command in Tskhinvali

The transformation became more evident with the rise of Marat Kambolov, a Russian official from North Ossetia who holds Russian citizenship, to the position of Prime Minister, before assuming the role of Acting President following Gagloyev's resignation.

Kambolov is not from South Ossetia, and he previously held high-ranking positions in Russian state institutions, most notably the General Directorate of the Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Physics, and served as Deputy Minister of Education and Science.

Earlier in July, Putin received him in Moscow, announcing his support for Kambolov's candidacy in the presidential elections scheduled for next September. Analysts considered this move an additional indication of the growing direct Russian influence within the governing institutions of the breakaway republic.

Despite the Kremlin’s official assertion that there are no plans to annex South Ossetia, the accelerated administrative and economic integration, along with the appointment of Russian officials to key decision-making positions, reinforces estimates that Moscow is laying the groundwork for a deeper institutional association that could in the future lead to an official annexation or integration within the Russian-Belarusian Union State.

Quiet annexation instead of referendums

The idea of joining Russia is not new for South Ossetia; in fact, the local leadership proposed holding a referendum on joining in 2022. However, the plan was shelved at the time due to the war in Ukraine.

Today, however, it seems that Moscow prefers a different path based on the gradual integration of institutions, laws, and political elites, thereby reducing the political and diplomatic costs that a direct annexation might provoke.

Analysts believe that this path could also provide domestic gains for the Kremlin, at a time when Russia is facing economic and security challenges and increasing pressure as a result of the war in Ukraine.

Will the scenario repeat itself in Abkhazia?

The new experiment raises questions about the possibility of applying these political games to Abkhazia; however, the facts on the ground indicate that there are fundamental differences between the two republics. Despite Abkhazia's heavy reliance on Russian economic and military support, local elites have repeatedly resisted any measures that might undermine the independence of their institutions in recent years.

In late 2024, the region witnessed widespread protests against an agreement that granted special privileges to Russian real estate developers, and the crisis ended with the resignation of the de facto president Aslan Bzhania and the holding of new elections.

Since then, the Kremlin has adopted a different policy based on a combination of economic pressure and co-opting local elites, under the direct supervision of Sergey Kiriyenko, one of the top officials in the Russian Presidential Administration and the person responsible for the Abkhazia dossier.

Despite the election of Badr Gunba, who is backed by Moscow, as the region's president, the Abkhaz authorities later rushed to pass legislation prohibiting non-residents from holding political positions, and imposed a five-year residency requirement on candidates for elected institutions. This move was interpreted as an attempt to prevent a repeat of the South Ossetia model.

Anxiety in Georgia

In Tbilisi, opposition forces described the Russian agreement with South Ossetia as "a new stage of annexation," considering that Moscow is moving toward imposing direct administration over territories that Georgia regards as part of its sovereignty.

The Georgian Foreign Ministry also accused Russia of taking additional steps toward annexing the region, although the response of the Georgian government remained limited, raising questions about its desire to avoid a direct political confrontation with Moscow.

A test for a new Russian strategy

Observers believe that South Ossetia may become a testing ground for a new Russian strategy based on the gradual integration of separatist entities through unifying laws, strengthening economic ties, and placing Russian figures in leadership positions, rather than resorting to rapid annexation steps that could provoke the international community.

However, the success of this model outside South Ossetia does not seem guaranteed, especially in Abkhazia, where large segments of the elites and the population still cling to some degree of autonomy, despite their heavy reliance on Russian support.

As Moscow continues to strengthen its influence in the post-Soviet regions, the prevailing question remains whether the experience of South Ossetia will remain an exceptional case, or if it represents the beginning of a new phase of redefining Russian influence in its geographic surroundings.